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I. INTRODUCTION

Presidential elections often are good barometers of the
national mood, though their fullest implications are likely best
read in hindsight rather than on the eve of the primaries.
Nevertheless, a fair reading of the 2012 national mood, as of this
pre-election day writing, is that the American people are divided
between a vision of government as ally versus government as
antagonist. On the partisan poles are those who may be
described as strongly and consistently pro-government in their
leanings, on the one end, and those who are strongly and
consistently libertarian, on the other end. Although most
Americans likely lie in between these statism poles, and
selectively invoke the benefits or harms of government power,
broad-strokes political rhetoric today increasingly rings
1. Cf J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
2. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law. Associate
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
3. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law.
4. Regents' Professor, Milton 0. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law. and Dean
Emerita, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law.
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libertarian bells. Anxiety about government efficacy,
government wisdom, and government expanse has prompted
conservatives and liberals alike to ask whether, and in what
contexts, government assistance is a welcome means of assuring
that individuals can fulfill their potential as well as assuring that
the country can realize collective goals, versus an unwelcome,
"nanny state" intrusion into individual freedoms.
In the scholarly version of these wider political debates, the
discussion about the limits of government power over individual
freedoms sometimes is couched in terms of communitarian
versus liberal visions of government power, and how American
constitutional law shapes each vision. Influential communitarian
scholars for years have critiqued strong liberal theories of rights
on the ground that they "exalt rights over responsibilities,
licensing irresponsible conduct and spawning frivolous assertions
of rights at the expense of encouraging personal responsibility
and responsibility to community" (p. 1). In their view, limiting
government power in the interest of preserving individual liberty
has contributed to an erosion of the public good, and a
weakening of civic virtue. Civil liberties and civil rights, as they
have evolved since the 1960s, have imposed significant social
costs that have mounted in ways that seriously compromise our
collective well-being. According to these critics, "liberty as
license"- that is, an approach to rights that takes them too
absolutely- has been pursued instead of an "ordered liberty"
that bows more deeply to the common good and that takes the
responsibility part of the rights/responsibility balance more
seriously (p. 1).
Central to this debate is how much, and in what contexts,
government should be allowed to inculcate civic virtue. At what
point does government intervention impern1issibly erode
individual and private associational autonomy? For example, is a
federal command that all Americans do their part to assure
affordable health insurance for all by purchasing insurance or
suffering tax consequences an expression of "ordered liberty" or
an undue invasion of liberty? Is a decision by a young and
apparently healthy person to forgo purchase of health insurance
irresponsible? A decision to undergo an early-terrn abortion? To
enter into a same-sex relationship? Or, are all of these decisions
ones that a liberal constitutional order properly must leave to
the individual with little or no government restrictions?
How, if at all, do the classic communitarian arguments in
favor of allowing government to inculcate civic virtue stack up
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against the realities of governance? Do growing concerns about
government dysfunction, gridlock, corruption, and hyperpartisanship undermine or fortify the communitarian arguments
against liberal rights where they conflict with a "common good"?
Finally, are communitarians right to insist that the recognition of
liberal rights in fact requires or encourages government (and
others) to suspend critical judgment of the decisions in ways that
obscure the costs of rights, the "wrongness" of behaviors that
nevertheless receive legal protection, and their potential harm to
others?
James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain have authored an
important and intellectually accessible new book that canvasses
the communitarian critique of a liberal theory of rights, and
responds to its central claims. The book's arrival is especially
well timed given the roiling national debate about the proper
reach of government authority, and may offer an important
corrective to some of the Constitution-based claims being made
in these debates, if not to more general claims about a culture of
selfishness. It also debuts at a moment when arguments for and
against particular constitutional rights, such as reproductive
rights, are gaining momentum. That is, the scope and content of
constitutional liberalism are very much at issue, with some
seeking more liberty and others favoring less restraint on
government power.
Building on decades of thoughtful scholarship that
addresses communitarian and progressive objections to liberal
theories of rights, the authors offer a persuasive response to
arguments that cultural liberalism- the popular understanding
and expression of liberal rights- is a natural extension of
constitutional liberalism. As they explain, our constitutional
liberalism, properly understood, is neither a deep font of strong
libertarian principles that greatly restrict government power to
inculcate virtues, nor a source of limitless government power to
do so. Rather, it imposes a highly contextual brake on
government power that rises and falls even within the context of
so-called "fundamental rights" where liberty is most protected.
The constitutional doctrine they discuss matters, because
the doctrine is the framework within which American
constitutional liberalism operates. This judge-made law affords
government ample power to incentivize virtue, to inculcate
values, and even to penalize or criminalize its version of
individual "irresponsibility." In fact, libertarian complaints stem
from a sense that the law offers individuals too little protection,
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not too much. Consequently, the claim that constitutional
liberalism has caused the alleged slide in our collective virtue by
insisting on "empty toleration" of values and behaviors seems
seriously overblown. Little in modern constitutional law or in
actual government practice supports a narrow reading of
government's moral authority, or a dichotomous reading of
rights versus responsibilities.
Fleming and McClain support this claim with several
compelling constitutional examples. With each, they ask whether
the law in fact requires government neutrality or "empty
toleration." Their analysis shows that government neutrality is
rarely required, even in zones of otherwise protected constitutional privacy. For example, the constitutionally protected
right to abortion does not compel the state to remain neutral
regarding reproductive choices. Current law allows the
government to weigh in on the exercise of this fundamental
right, and many states now do so in increasingly forceful, nonneutral, and moralizing ways (pp. 53-63, 69-73).
Likewise, other fundamental rights-including freedom of
expression- do not render government mute in the face of
personal choices. Protection of harmful political expressionsuch as excessively vitriolic and misleading characterizations of
one's political opponents or lies about one's own
accomplishments or about others" -does not prohibit official or
private condemnation of dirty politics or shameful falsehoods.
Nor does protection of sexual autonomy or marital rights require
government to remain agnostic regarding the responsible
exercise of these rights.
Also, government may be constitutionally required to
protect individual rights, but it is not required to provide
financial support for the exercise of the rights. It may do so,
short of fairly limited and contested constitutional limits. This in
turn gives government formidable power to in11uence private
?ecisio~s-power that can look, and feel, more coercive than
Instructive.
Still another important caveat to constitutional liberalism is
that it polices only government power, not private power. With
the notable exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, 7 which
restricts private power directly, constitutional rights obtain vis-a5.
6.
7.

See infra text accompanying notes 19-20.
See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
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vis government authority, not private authority. The so-called
"state action doctrine" 8 is a profoundly significant limit on the
reach of constitutional rights that is often neglected in arguments
against expansive civil liberties.
Finally, constitutional liberalism respects rights on a
continuum. The constitutional practice entails a balance between
rights and responsibility, between government and private
power, not an aU-or-nothing choice between them. It identifies
rights, and grants the judiciary power to police them. But judges
do so in a context, and according to standards, that typicallynot rarely-require deference to the politically accountable
branches of government.
The constitutional case law therefore can accommodate
communitarian arguments about the balance between rights and
responsibilities. In each area of constitutional rights, the law
offers rules and important exceptions. Due process protects
reproductive privacy, except when it does not. 9 Freedom of
expression prohibits government limits on political speech,
except when its national security consequences seem too great. 10
The First Amendment requires accommodation of religious
pluralism, except when it may leave "public education in
shreds." 11 The case law allows for family autonomy, except when
it costs too much in terms of a collective interest in child physical
well-being and capacity for meaningful adult autonomy and
citizenship. 12 Constitutional law, unsurprisingly, tracks a wider
cultural ambivalence about unbridled freedom from regulatory
and social constraints, versus national or local government
insistence on conformity.

8. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124 (2007) (upholding on facial challenge
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
10. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian ·Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding restrictions on support provided to foreign terrorist organizations challenged on
freedom of expression grounds).
11. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 255 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of the warring
sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in
shreds.").
12. Compare Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that state law
unconstitutionally interfered with parental right to control the upbringing of one's
children by prohibiting parochial school education), with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982) (recognizing state right to terminate parental rights if need to do so is proven
by clear and convincing evidence).
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This is why, even in the current hyper-partisan climate,n
people on both sides of the electable political aisle (though not
at their farthest edges) can plausibly invoke constitutional law as
a basis for their claims. The law is broad enough to support both
a moderate liberal and a moderate conservative spin on the
proper reach of government power over individual "rights."
What is missing from many of these spins on constitutional law,
however, is open acknowledgement of how strong claims in
either direction have to be qualified by significant doctrine that
belies them.
This is also why scholarly debates between moderate
communitarian and moderate liberal visions of rights, upon
closer examination, turn less on the alleged fundamentals of
constitutional liberalism than on its specific applications. Neither
side of this particular scholarly debate denies the in1portance of
virtues or of rights. Communitarians concede the need for rights,
and moderate liberals concede the need for virtue. As such, the
dichotomy between them is easily overstated.
Fleming and McClain get this. They respectfully engage
both sides of this theoretical debate and guide the reader to the
following, sensible insight: constitutional liberalism cannot
plausibly be blamed for any of the alleged excesses of our
cultural liberalism. It can only be blamed- or praised- for
adding liberal rights to our cultural vocabulary, and thereby
asking government to moderate, but not abandon, its civic virtue
impulses.
The authors conclude that the liberal rights vocabulary and
the individual liberty values it represents are very much worth
preserving, even though communitarians and liberal theorists
may disagree on where to draw the liberal rights lines. They
endorse a moderate form of constitutional "perfectionism" that
makes space for government encouragement of virtue and
responsibility, but not for compelled moral conformity or
coercion. They also-notably-include a feminist perspective on
liberal responsibility and ordered liberty.
Government can, in their view, cultivate virtue in a manner
that respects freedom (p. 179). The liberal appeal to choice,
autonomy, and toleration is not inherently in conflict with a
13. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) (describing the current state of partisan political

gridlock).
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republican appeal to moral goods- at least it is not "in a liberal
republican constitutional democracy such as our own" (p. 180).
Government may, and should, both support rights and engage in
a formative project that affirmatively instills the non-neutral
virtues of liberal citizenship (p. 183). A central aim of this
formative project should be to cultivate respect for public reason
and for individual dignity (pp. 188-89).
II. FALSE DICHOTOMIES
Among the most important contributions of the Fleming
and McClain book is its demonstration that those who indict
constitutional liberalism for enervating civic virtues rely on a
false dichotomy between rights and responsibilities. As the
authors show, there actually are multiple false dichotomies
operating here.
A. RIGHTS VERSUS RESPONSIBILITIES
The book spends considerable time on the primary
dichotomy of rights versus responsibilities. The focus is the
influential work of Mary Ann Glendon from the early 1990s that
critiques American "rights talk" on the ground that it is silent on
responsibilities in ways that other countries' versions of rights
are not (pp. 21-48). The silence is particularly lamentable in the
modern world, she argues, because the "seedbeds of virtue" that
once supplemented the constitutional text-such as strong
families, associations, and collective moral and religious normshave eroded (p. 24). Absent these cultural cords, Americans
have only law to bind them, and its liberal strands are too thin to
inspire collective virtue. We have come to regard our political
birthright as freedom from morality and responsibility, not an
inherited obligation to respect their dictates. Our national rightscentered (and self-centered) vocabulary is about our individual
entitlements rather than about our common obligations, and our
nation is the poorer for it.
But as Fleming and McClain explain, one cannot draw the
causal arrow so directly from our actual constitutional liberalism
to this cultural construction of liberalism- even assuming it is an
accurate depiction of what "we" think about our collective
duties. Glendon and others critical of liberal rights often treat
the early work of Ronald Dworkin, which describes rights as
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"trumps," 14 as "the bete nair of [their] charges of irresponsibility"
(p. 1).
These communitarian arguments miss the mark, for two
reasons. First, Dworkin may have insisted that rights are
"trumps," and may have urged a strong version of liberal rights
(pp. 22-23), but he did not mean all rights. His focus was on
fundamental rights. Second, Dworkin clearly is not the
authoritative voice of tnainstream constitutional liberalism. A
better example of the latter might be Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, or his successor and former clerk, Chief Justice John
Roberts. The better cultural and constitutional texts to examine
to test the claim that constitutional rights talk has affected our
cultural identity would be the judicial opinions that define the
constitutional liberties, rather than academic tracts that analyze
and critique these opinions.
Fleming and McClain discuss key pieces of this case law and
show why the case law does not support the claim that
constitutional liberalism rejects responsibility or even is silent on
it. Two of their most powerful examples are the cases on
reproductive freedom and on freedom of speech. Especially in
recent years, the former allows explicitly for government actors
to weigh in on whether and how a woman should exercise her
reproductive freedoms (pp. 68-75). In the abortion context in
particular, the Court has emphasized that a womlan "cannot be
15
isolated in her privacy;" she is far from it, in fact.
Even in the realm of freedom of speech, where the Court
often is at its liberalism best, the full arc of the cases shows how
much room government has to speak its own mind. The Court
16
may insist that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric," but it
also permits significant government restraint of speech in
bounded settings, in nonpublic fora, on broadcast media, when
minors are likely to be present, when government is funding the
expression, and especially when the Sfeech is properly regarded
as the government's own message. 1 Constitutional liberalism
allows for these forms of value-inflected, non-neutral restraints
on freedom of expression. Likewise, liberalism theory is not in
14. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,159 (1973).
16. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,25 (1971).
17. See Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy,
and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 375, 390-98 (2012) (discussing the limits of First Amendment protection and
explaining why doctrine does not block all efforts to promote collective norms).

2013]

SOME REALISM

391

fatal tension with efforts to inspire responsible exercise of
freedom of expression: for example, "government and other
norm inculcators may have a liberalism-based interest in
encouraging speakers to observe the habits of civility" in order
to secure the conditions for the marketplace of ideas to work as
intended, and have ample means of doing so. 18
Nor does the protection of speaker autonomy mean
government actors are powerless to condemn the speaker, even
in their official voice. Cases that celebrate expressive autonomy
often include judicial homilies about the harms of that freedom,
or the moral shortcomings of the speaker. The dissents are one
source of this official moralizing; 19 but the majority opinions too
are written in ways that express respect for the right, but
contempt for the countercultural messenger. 2° Few people
reading these opinions would come away with the sense that the
protected speakers are cultural heroes, or that they should not
suffer social ostracism or censure for their behavior.
As the authors correctly observe, there also are other ways
in which government can, does, and should put its meaty thumb
on the values scale. In Chapter 5, they explain how government
plays a role in promoting civic virtues through annual
Constitution Day celebrations, civic education, and control of
public school curricula (pp. 112-45). They applaud these efforts,
provided the lessons learned are ones that respect liberal
democratic values, 21 or as Gerald Graff has put it, that "teach the
conflicts." 22 Of course, as the late 1980s-early 90s high octane
debate about "cultural literacy" and calls for a nationally
uniform curriculum demonstrated, these are never easy or
noncontroversial lessons to craft. 23 But few liberal theorists deny
18. Id. at 399.
19. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
20. See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542, 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(Kennedy, J.) (striking down the Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds, but
stating about the respondent that "[l]ying was his habit" and describing his statements as
"contemptible").
21. They appreciate the complexity of balancing the liberal interest in non-coercion
and respect for plural values against the collective interest in assuring that children are
effectively trained in the habits of citizenship and a non-neutral respect for shared values.
As Mark Yudof said years ago, there is no "Archimedean point." Mark G. Yudof,
Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59
IND. L.J. 527 (1984).
22. See GERALD GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS: HOW TEACHING THE
CONFLICTS CAN REVITALIZE AMERICAN EDUCATION (1992). See also AMY GUTMAN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987).
23. See TONI MARIE MASSARO, CONSTITUTIONAL LITERACY: A CORE
CURRICULUM FOR A MULTICULTURAL NATION (1993) (discussing debate and proposing
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the importance of common lessons for American children as a
24
precondition to liberal adulthood, and all likely recognize the
wisdom in Steven Shiffrin's observation that "children are the
25
Achilles heel of liberal ideology."
Two other, profoundly important ways in which government
may lend its moral voice to cultural conversations bear repeating
here. First there is the so-called "government speech" exception,
under which the Court has said government's own speech raises
no First Amendment concern at all, apart from the
26
Establishment Clause limits. That is, when the message is
clearly government's own, versus that of a private individual, it
need not be content- or even viewpoint-neutral. Second is the
government's mighty purse-strings power, which includes the
27
right to condition access to funding on decency criteria, on
2
nondiscrimination criteria, H and other non-neutral conditions.
The latter power and its proper constitutional limits have been at
29
the heart of current controversies over ethnic studies curricula
0
and religious student groups seeking official status (pp. 146-76):'
These controversies, like calls for civic education, bring to light
how much power government reserves to make value-laden
choices, despite our constitutional liberalism and even because
of it.
Last but surely not least is the state action doctrine, 31 which
Fleming and McClain do not address in detail. In Chapter 4, they

balance between liberal and civic republican visions of a core curriculum).
24. /d. at 138-40.
25. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,647 (1980).
26. See Pleasant Grove City. Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
27. See Nafl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569. 572-73 (1998)
(upholding congressional standards, on a facial challenge, that directed the National
Endowment for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public" when evaluating the artistic merit of
grant applications (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)(1994)).
28. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002) (upholding
voucher program that conditioned application of vouchers on commitment not to
"advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion").
29. See Arizona House Bill 2281, which conditions state funding on not including
courses or classes that "promote resentment toward a race or class of people" or that
"advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals" and that
allegedly was triggered by Tucson High School's Mexican-American Studies Program.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-112(A)(2), (4) (2012); see also H.B. 2281, 49th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
30. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); see also Toni M.
Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569,
611-17 (2011 ).
31. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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discuss civil society's role in "cultivating the 'seedbeds of virtue"'
and outline the communitarian critique of the erosion of intermediate organizations between the individual and government
that are necessary to cultivating virtue (pp. 81-111). What is
missing here is the fundamental distinction between constitutional liberalism and rights imposed through democratic
processes. If constitutional rights are the real threat to these
intermediate institutions, then the peril is greatly mitigated by
the fact that only government action can violate constitutional
. hts.·12
ng
In fact, as the authors recognize (pp. 98-101), a common
criticism of constitutional liberalism is that it conceptualizes
liberty as freedom from government, not from private parties
who may exercise their authority over individuals in profoundly
illiberal ways. The public/private split is not a natural one, or one
that neatly divides public responsibilities from private liberties.
Nevertheless, the arc of the modern state action cases bends
deeply toward allowing significant government support of
private actors without thereby transforming the latter into "state
actors" for constitutional purposes. 33 Private parties and
intermediate social institutions therefore have wide constitutional space in which to enforce their moral visions, even with
government assistance. If anything, the worry should be over too
little enforceable liberal autonomy and values agnosticism,
rather than too much.
B. NEGATIVE RIGHTS VERSUS POSITIVE RIGHTS
Closely related to the state action point is the negative
rights critique of liberalism. A primary criticism of liberal rights
theories has always been- from the political left and the political
right- that liberalism is about negative rights rather than
positive rights. The liberal version of rights, under this account,
is best captured by the notion of "freedom from'' government,
and not "a charter of positive benefits imposing affirmative
obligations upon government to secure the preconditions for ...
justice" (p. 7). Progressive theorists condemn constitutional
liberalism for its impoverished view of government responsibility
to provide food, medical care, education, housing, employment,

32. A notable exception here is the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note 7.
33. See, e.g .. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. ~30 ( 1982) (holding that a private
school that received over ninety percent of its funding from government sources was not,
perforce, a state actor when it fired one of its teachers).
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and other preconditions to an autonomous life. Comtnunitarians,
in turn, worry that the "freedom from" construction of rights
promotes individual irresponsibility.
The first criticism is plainly important, though it is not the
primary one advanced by communitarians. Fleming and McClain
are sympathetic to the progressivism aims of rrLany who find
liberalism thin gruel for justice. But they also advance the
argument that liberalism must acknowledge that it works only if
certain preconditions are met, and they call for progressive
corrections to our constitutional doctrine and practices that take
this objection seriously. The baseline of liberal rights need not be
abandoned, by their account, unless one interprets liberalism
woodenly to deny the substantive corrections necessary for it to
be more than an empty promise. Just as constitutional liberalism
does not deny the costs of freedom, and allows government to
weigh in on the exercise of rights in ways that promote
responsibility, it does not disable government from stepping in to
make liberalism practically feasible and humane. If it did, then
surely the libertarian hue and cry over too many government
"entitlements" and creeping socialism would be patently absurd.
Many important government programs have emerged to support
those who need assistance, especially children, to assure they
have meaningful access to goods and services that are relevant to
liberal autonomy. Existing programs may be woefully
inadequate to meet the needs, but this is not because liberal
rights talk prevents new or better ones from being adopted. On
the contrary, the rights talk often may be useful ways of
mustering political will to address the needs. The key here is to
distinguish between liberalism reality and liberalisn1 mythology.
Realism also requires one to recognize that liberal rights
discourse may be mobilized in service of progressive ends. As
Jack Balkin pointed out over two decades ago, even progressives
who are profoundly skeptical of liberalism tropes in some
constitutional settings-i.e., because liberalism romanticizes
individual autonomy, the private sphere, and laissez-faire
approaches to pre-existing economic and social conditions- still
may "cling to libertarianism" in other settings because they
cannot think of any other way to conceptualize the specific
34
rights. The stickiness of the libertarian-sounding vocabulary
should not be confused with the reality of the many
communitarian and progressive amendments to liberalism that
34.

See Balkin, supra note 1, at 387.
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pervade constitutional doctrine and government practice, and
that support the meaningful exercise of liberal rights. In sum,
rights in the United States are not purely negative rights, and
liberal rights talk has not made government responsiveness to
progressive or communitarian dernands impossible.
Here again, the state action doctrine plays a vital but often
underappreciated role. Since the 1970s, the Court has retreated
from earlier civil rights era cases that more readily found
government involvement in private discrimination sufficient to
trigger constitutional rights. 35 If federal, state, and local laws that
apply to private associations intrude further into their autonomy
than does the Constitution-which they surely do-this is not
obviously a "communitarian" dilemma that can be explained by
"too much liberalism." It may be better described as too much
rights-inflected communitarianism, due to "overregulation" by a
majority that believes its intrusions into the private sphere are in
the "common interest."
C. LIBERTY VERSUS EQUALITY
A third, false dichotomy is the one sometimes drawn
between liberty and equality. For some critics of liberalism, the
heart of the problem is liberalism's inadequate attention to
private inequality. This argument comes in two basic forms. The
most muscular form of the critique is that freedom for some will
always entail less freedom for others, given the unequal
distribution of power, wealth, and other goods among us. Only
through redistributive measures and the rejection of strong
liberalism principles can the agonizing inequality concerns be
addressed. Liberalism itself is the cord that must be cut, in order
to usher in a more progressive form of constitutional justice. For
example, freedom of speech should be analyzed in light of
unequal access to it, and government should be permitted to
make significant adjustments to level the discourse playing field
without worrying about traditional liberalism objections to these
moves. To get there, substantive equality must become the firsttier constitutional concern, rather than beginning with an
assumption of freedom from government action as the primary
measure of constitutional liberty or invoking strictly liberal
constructions of equality (i.e., same treatment, hut not same
outcomes), and then adding equalizing corrections.
35. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). with Moose
Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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The second form of the equality critique of liberalism is less
adventurous. Here, the critique is not that governrnent cannot
respond to inequality because liberal assumptions bar these
interventions; rather, it is that the liberal presumptions operate
until they are pierced, and the piercing decisions often are
unfair. The n1ythology of self-sufficient, liberal autonomous
actors is maintained whenever it serves the interests of those in
power. When liberalism does not serve these interests, however,
government acts n1ore swiftly to offer assistance even if doing so
is the antithesis of libertarian laissez-faire rhetoric. Liberal rights
thus may conflict with equal rights, but they do so selectively and
contextually rather than inherently. The proper goal should be
liberal rights for all, not just for some, and reasonably equal
access to the baseline tools and conditions necessary to
participate effectively in a liberal democratic society.
Fleming and McClain embrace the latter view. In other
words, they see the liberty versus equality dichotmny, like the
foregoing ones, as a false one. Nothing about constitutional
liberalism principles per se rules out equality adjustments.
Liberal rights do not exist in a social vacuum, and preexisting
conditions matter a lot to the exercise of rights. Ordering of
liberal rights in a pluralistic society thus may require more than
the procedural correction of taking turns; it may entail ceding
one's own liberal space, time, money, and freedoms in order to
accommodate others' needs. But this redistribution of goods
does not mean we abandon our liberal aspirations; it means we
keep our progressive and communitarian wits about us and be
vigilant to make corrections necessary to leveling the liberal
playing field. Liberty and equality, by this account, are
interdependent.
On a doctrinal level, of course, the Court has recognized
that liberty and equality are intertwined. The original Bill of
Rights nowhere cites equal protection of law, yet the Court in
Bolling v. Sharpe asserted that "the concepts of equal protection
and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
36
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. " Indeed, no decent liberal
order can exist without a thin version of equality, at the very
least, if not a more robust form that requires affirmative action
and that is aggressively anti-caste.

36.

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347U.S. 497, 49R-99 (1954).
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D. MINIMALISM VERSUS PERFECTIONISM: "THIN" VERSUS
"THICK" RIGHTS

A final false dichotomy that Fleming and McClain examine
is the one drawn between minimal and perfectionist, or ''thin"
versus "thick" versions of constitutional liberalism. In this
section, they focus in particular on the work of Michael Sandel,
who argues that liberal justifications for liberal rights are too
thin, and of Cass R. Sunstein, who makes the con1peting claim
that they may be too thick (pp. 207-36).
As the authors show, however, constitutional liberalism in
practice is both thick and thin. It makes very different demands,
depending on the context and applicable set of competing
concerns, and it might best be described as a form of mild
perfectionism, which Fleming and McClain endorse. The
practice is fairly non-intrusive into the political process, typically
moves incrementally, not precipitously, and anticipates a balance
of constitutional interests.
The least that constitutional liberalism requires is captured
by the so-called "rational basis" standard of judicial review,
under which courts strongly defer to government actors absent a
showing that their decisions are grossly excessive, arbitrary and
17
capricious, or inspired by baseless animus. The most that
constitutional liberalism requires is captured by the so-called
"strict" or "exacting" scrutiny standard of judicial review,
1
triggered by "fundamental" rights x and "suspect" classifications.3l) In these cases, the government bears the burden of
proving that its actions promote a compelling or significant
government purpose and that the measures are narrowly tailored
to advance that purpose.
On the thin, rational basis end of the liberty spectrum the
courts do very little to interfere with the political community's
policy decisions. As such, they are mindful of the Sunstein
concern about judicial minimalism and potential backlash. This
is so despite libertarian concerns about government programs
that unduly burden liberty and property interests, and despite
progressive concerns about the relative absence of meaningful or
"thicker" constitutional protection of rights for the poor, and for
37. See, e.g, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla .. 34X U.S. 4X3, 4X9 (1955) (setting
forth rational basis standard for judicial review of socioeconomic legislation).
3X. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 3X6 (197R) (describing the right to
marry as a fundamental right that triggers elevated judicial scrutiny).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (stating that strict
scrutiny applies to all government racial classifications).
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other vulnerable classes of persons. Yet even the rational basis
end of the spectrum is fanned. It ranges from its "toothless"
version of nearly uncritical deference to a more searching
inquiry into governmental reasons, based upon the importance
of the interest at stake, the political vulnerability of the
burdened persons, and any strong whiff of animus against them.
When judicial review is at its thinnest, it still stands as a
reminder that government actors are expected to observe
baseline rationality and that courts reserve theoretical power to
compel this, in particularly egregious cases.
On the thick, fundamental rights end of the spectrum,
courts are more aggressive and betray some of the liberal
perfectionism that Sandel admires and Glendon and Sunstein
fear. But courts still consider political community interests as
part of the rights calculus. Just as rational basis has a thick end,
strict scrutiny has a thin one.
In short, neither pure minimalism not pure perfectionism
governs at either end of the rights spectrum, or even within the
applicable categories. Judges locate liberal rights in "tiers," but
also on a continuum. Formalists might prefer less float in the
process, or a meatier thumb on either side of the minimalism
versus perfectionism scale, but the current constitutional case
law respects neither desire.
This means that constitutional rights can begin on one end
of the spectrum, and slowly migrate to the other end over time,
as cultural understanding of the liberty interests at stake evolves.
A thin, liberal justification for a right typically initiates the
movement-say, a strong libertarian argument against criminalizing same-sex sodomy between two consenting adults in the
privacy of their own home where no showing of tangible harm to
others is made. But it can eventually ripen into a thicker, more
perfectionist and value-laden justification for a related aspect of
that minimalist right, such as the refusal to countenance private
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by denying
public funds to those who practice such discrimination, or official
respect for the relationship by allowing same-sex partners to
marry. A thin liberal right thereby may ripen into thick,
fundamental status under which the conduct and the people
thought to be defined by the conduct are rnore explicitly
affirnzed, not just protected from physical harmt or imprisonment. But even when a right attains fundamental status, as
reproductive rights and freedom of speech prove, the
government still may moralize about the exercise of the right.
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The liberal right to do something is not necessarily the right to
be respected for it. Liberal rights obviously may hasten the
process of gaining cultural approbation of the protected
behavior, but they rarely are granted before cultural tolerance of
the behavior has begun. In a plural society, one should not
expect that the former will always follow from the latter, but the
latter almost always precedes the former in any event.
Constitutional liberalism reflects these contextually and
temporally variable aspects of rights. Our most partisan divides
tend to trigger what Dan Kahan has called "thin walls
40
liberalism," under which the most we can expect of each other
is the behavior of people who live in "a building with thin
41
walls." In this liberal order, citizens "avoid the types of
advocacy-akin to behaving raucously in a room that abuts one's
neighbor's bedroom- that foreclose or impede the efforts of
other groups to form understandings of law affirming to them. " 42
At the least, we must "keep our voices down" as we exercise our
own liberal rights in our own apartments. But we do have the
right to live there. Tolerance, not respect, governs- but just
barely.
On the other, thicker end of our liberal community
aspirations we expect more than live-and-let-live, barely tolerant
neighbors in a metaphorical urban apartment building: we seek a
liberal order in which our fellow citizens know us, respect us,
look out for our children, elect us to leadership roles, and
include us in their thicker community embrace- especially when
we are down on our luck.
But again, first-wave rights bearers often will settle for
tolerance and thin walls- the right to live there- especially if the
choice is between no rights and minimum rights. Moreover, the
gestation period of the thicker version of rights (i.e., rights
justified by more than strictly libertarian justifications) can be
generations; such perfectionism, even in its early or "mild" form,
may lie just beyond the reach of a living human's grasp.
Consequently, thin walls liberalism is nothing to sneer at, is often
hard won, and would be a lot to lose. First-wave rights bearers
know this, and rarely take their first-step, liberal rights gains for

40.
(2007).
41.
42.

Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60
!d.
!d. at 148.

STAN.

L. REV. 115, 147-48
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granted, or make liberal perfectionism the enen1y of a liberal
good.
The primary point, for Fleming and McClain's purposes, is
that our constitutional liberalism includes both ends of the
liberal rights continuum. The questions of when and where thin
versions of rights should suffice, or thicker rights are called for,
can be extremely divisive. The answers, however, are not
obviously implied by invoking perfectionism or noinimalism per
se.

E. RESPONSIBILITY AS ACCOUNTABILITY \'ERSUS
RESPONSIBILITY AS AUTONOMY

The authors do an excellent job of disclosing why the
foregoing dichotomies are false. Yet they introduce one of their
own, which suffers frorn similar weaknesses. Specifically, they
attempt to rescue liberalism from the charge of irresponsibility
by claiming that there are "two different, although related,"
meanings of responsibility: "responsibility as accountability to
community versus responsibility as autonorny, or selfgovernment, respectively" (p. 21 ). They elaborate on these
concepts as follows:
As we use the terms, "responsibility as accountability"
connotes being answerable to others for the manner and
consequences of the exercise of one's rights, whereas
''responsibility as autonomy" connotes self-governance, that
is, entrusting the right-holder to exercise moral responsibility
in making decisions guided by conscience and deliberation (p.
21 ).

The saving phrase here may be "although related ..,, Nevertheless,
the authors seem to believe the two concepts are sufficiently
distinguishable to rest considerable weight on the distinction.
Responsibility as autonomy, they continue, allows government
to encourage reflective decision making without steering a person
toward one choice or another (p. 68). For example, "balanced
counseling" regarding whether to seek an abortion may be
allowed (p. 68), but not governmental coercion or persuasion
premised on paternalistic notions of women's incapacity to make
independent decisions (p. 73).
I do not buy this distinction. The line between balanced,
government measures that support reflective decision making
and those that feel skewed in favor of government value choices
and coercive is hopelessly fuzzy, subjective, and difficult to
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isolate. One man's information about adoption options may be
another woman's sermon against an early term abortion.
Likewise, one parent's liberal-inspired civic education may be
another's illiberal inculcation of secular humanism. 43 There is no
such thing as neutral government education, or a neutral
formative project. Even balance among non-neutral views
relevant to the exercise of a right is difficult to achieve, given the
time limited and didactic nature of counseling and of education.
This does not mean, however, that a non-coercion
aspiration is meaningless, or that the liberalis1n insight is
irrelevant to government approaches to its educative role. To say
that we are influenced and shaped by our liberal democratic
government, that government can and does moralize, or that
rights and responsibilities are intertwined in a liberal democratic
order, does not mean we do not ever invoke or draw the line
between legitimate persuasion and illegitimate coercion. It
means that the distinction between "responsibility as autonomy''
and "responsibility as accountability" is subjective, and that
Fleming and McClain do not prove that government abortion
counseling necessarily crosses that newly-coined line. At some
point, the theorist, teacher, or judge must make the leap, despite
the inescapable subjectivity and value-inflection problem. In this
particular case, I happen to agree with Fleming and McClain's
judgment call, just not with their justification that it turns on a
clear distinction between responsibility as autonomy versus
responsibility as accountability.
The more important- and to me more convincing- feature
of the distinction between these two forms of responsibility is
that responsibility as autonomy more emphatically focuses
attention on the liberal concern about coercion. It cautions
government actors that liberalism presumes adult decision
makers' autonomy, even as it anticipates some government
influence on the exercise of that autonomy. It even presumes
that children have rights, however limited, and are best treated
with a liberal respect for their emerging capacity for selfgovernance. For liberal rights advocates like Fleming and
McClain, this is a crucial reminder. It may curb government
enthusiasm for more explicitly directive, paternalistic or

43. This notion is captured beautifully by the enduringly insightful work of Nomi
Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination,
and the Paradox ofa Liheral f,'ducation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
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moralistic interventions, and it confronts directly the paradox of
any "liberal education" agenda.
III. BEYOND FALSE DICHOTOMIES?
If these are all false dichotomies, and our constitutional
liberalism is broad enough to embrace liberal rights and
communitarian and progressive critiques of their perceived
limitations and excesses, then what's the root of the
philosophical debates outlined here? Is it that Glendon simply
misreads the doctrine, that Sandel expects more perfectionism in
practice than the doctrine currently can deliver in selected cases,
or that Sunstein expects too little of rights and over-predicts
backlash based on isolated examples? Or is it that all of these
writers are fundamentally moderate, as are Fleming and
McClain, such that the theoretical differences between their
takes on liberal rights are relatively modest, and can be
accommodated within constitutional doctrine in ways that more
radical communitarian, liberal, or progressive accounts could
not?
I believe this last explanation is a major part of the answer.
This book is a friendly amendment to Glendon-style
communitarianism, and a mid-ground negotiation between
Sandel's perfectionism and Sunstein's minimalism. One can
easily imagine all five of these scholars on a panel, addressing
the political hot button topics of same-sex marriage, abortion,
and hate speech without a raised voice or failure to grasp-really
grasp-each other's points. They would not need to rely on thin
walls liberalism to engage one another's arguments, even where
they diverge on the preferred outcomes or ways of justifying
them. Their discussion is occurring within a quite congenial and
thick community discourse circle.
Can the same be said of the rest of us, in this election year?
Would reading Fleming and McClain's respectful intervention
make less moderate, less informed citizens better able to see
how constitutional rights and responsibilities can co-exist? Might
"we" be able to talk to each other about these same political
wedge issues, not just past each other, by invoking this fuller
account of our constitutional liberalism? Or are academic texts
like this beside the political point, no matter how accessibly they
are written?
I think books like this do matter, and not simply because of
an occupational predisposition to think so. Scholars are not the
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only ones currently engaged in the project of defending or
reimagining our constitutional liberalism at a deeper level. Some
of the efforts are silo-specific arguments to undo Roe v. Wade 44
45
or Citizens United v. FEC, or to take Lawrence v. Texas 46 to the
next level by extending the protected right to same-sex marriage.
But a growing number of people are arguing for tectonic changes
in constitutional law, and some even favor a second
47
constitutional convention. America today thus may be poised
for a full-on public discussion of our constitutional liberalism,
and Ordered Liberty may improve these public deliberations
because it offers a more nuanced way of thinking about the
potential benefits and costs of pitching big pieces of our
constitutional liberalism, or pulling it up at the roots. The book
shows the complexities and paradoxes of our constitutional law
as it is, and therefore offers a saner, more realistic starting point
for political arguments than many of the almost cartoonish
hyperbole in some political discourse. It presents the current law,
and the scholarly writing about that law, in a fair-minded and
non-distorted manner.
The book also reveals the fuller arc of that law. If anything,
Fleming and McClain's work may be too brief in this last respect.
The authors omit significant other doctrines that also support
their claim about the room for liberal rights and responsibility.
For example, they might have added a longer account of the
steady narrowing of the Establishment Clause brake on
government accommodation of religion, which allows moral
communities to seek government funding for religious
education, faith-based charities, and other forms of official
48
support for sectarian ends. They also might have spent greater
time on the state action conundrum, with its emphasis on the
private/public split, or the transfer of government functions to
private actors, both of which create a vast opening for private
actors to pursue their non-neutral ends with no constitutional
oversight whatsoever, and often with significant government
support.
Still another useful topic might have been the many
procedural and jurisdictional barriers to judicial protection of
44. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
45. 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
46. 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
47. See, e.g., RESTORING FREEDOM, www.restoringfrecdom.on' (last visited Apr.
17, 2013); ROOTSTRIKERS, www.rootstrikers.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
48. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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constitutional rights, which tame liberal rights. And they may
have expanded their discussion of how the Court in recent years
has fortified, not restricted, freedom of association rights in ways
that support private intermediate associations' ~ight to set
membership rules in ways that exclude some groups. ~o
A fully panoptic view of our constitutional liberalism would
reveal that it enforces (again, contextually and on a continuum)
a range of liberty-protective principles that rein in government
excesses: procedural and political process regularity, separation
of powers, prospectiv~ty and pro~ort_i~nali!( in. lawmaking,
transparency, and an Independent JUdiciary. VVhtch of these
liberal values has been pursued in unduly aggressive ways that
undermine our collective sense of responsibility for the common
good? Where, exactly, should the constitutional liberalisn1 cord
be cut, shortened, or strengthened?
Finally, the authors might have discussed the chipping away
at public schools' race-conscious affirmative action strategies by
the modern Court. 52 If the post-1960s civil rights revolution really
is to blame for our alleged cultural decline, then what should we
make of post-1991 (the year that the Glendon book, Rights Talk,
was published) constitutional developments that belie the claim
that civil rights are expanding?
More realism about our constitutional liberalism thus would
be extremely useful, especially in this election year in which all
political sides are waving the constitutional flag. i\ fresh start to
political discussions about how we might need to move forward,
or backward, or even to the side in our liberal rights regime
would ask the discussants to consider the doctrinal evidence
about what our liberal rights practice currently is, and whether it
in fact is protecting rights at the expense of responsibilities.

49. An example is standing doctrine. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding that taxpayers lacked constitutional standing to
challenge a tax credit, versus a tax expenditure, on Establishment Clause grounds).
50. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
51. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the
shared liberal democratic values that "due process" protects).
52. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (striking down race-conscious measures aimed at reducing racial isolation in
public school student population). See also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., U.S. Supreme Court
Case. No. 11-345 (pending affirmative action case involving the University of Texas).
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IV. CONCLUSION
I am well aware, as are Fleming and McClain, that liberal
rights talk can obfuscate as well as illuminate on the ground
real.ities. ~rogressiv~s' disgust with the obf~scatorx c~nsequences
of hberahsm rhetonc should be taken senously.· · L1kew1se, the
non-neutral, perfectionist ends that many progressives favor
remain unmet-especially the promise of protection of nonmajority voices and concerns. We therefore should continue to
advance progressive correctives that save liberalism from itself.
But liberalism rhetoric is neither the obvious cause of these
injustices, nor the wrong tool for attacking them. Faith in
liberalism-even misplaced faith-not only can be used to
advance progressive ends but is the language we currently have to
work with in pursuing these substantive ends. That familiar and
available language is, for the reasons Fleming and McClain
demonstrate, much richer and more nuanced than some of its
critics claim. It also has been instrumental in achieving some
quite admirable liberal democratic advances, including ones that
advance equal rights. Again, first-wave rights bearers may know
this best of all, and thus are often reluctant to toss aside the
constitutional and rhetorical tools that helped them to achieve
these hard fought victories.
Last, but surely not least, liberal rights talk insists, perhaps
more than any of its more self-consciously value-inflected
competitors, that we consider the possibility that everything we
currently believe 1nay be wrong. This is a valuable but
perpetually repressed insight that is especially useful in a
culturally and ideologically plural nation. A constitutional
starting point that stresses our intellectual and other human
frailties and reg uires us to reconsider our preconceptions and
convictions has real value in opening our eyes to new insights, as
any teacher, scientist, or political activist understands. Liberal
neutrality may well be a myth, but it also is an intellectual
framework that may be pitched at our peril. The many flaws of
our constitutional liberalism- paradoxically and ironically- may
be best revealed only if we invoke its obviously flawed
"marketplace" political discourse principles, its easily mocked

53. A recent critique of liberalism's emphasis on the "free market" myth makes this
point very powerfully. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). Cf LEFT LiBERALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown and Janet Halley eds., 2002) (discussing the left political
project and tensions between critiques of liberalism and pursuit of legal remedies).
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agnosticism about substantive ends, and its uneven respect for
procedural regularity. Unless and until we develop a better set of
first principles, we thus might do well to maintain the liberal
framework we have, and continue to use its vocabulary to press
our competing claims for better and non-neutral outcomes. At
the least, liberalism requires us to begin with respect for others'
right to disagree about these non-neutral ends.
Fleming and McClain demonstrate this kind of liberalismrooted respect for others' notions about what ends we should
pursue. True, they are engaging others who thenaselves respect
these discourse rules, and who operate within an academic
American "rights talk" culture that is relatively tight. True, their
"mild perfectionism" arguments are unlikely to persuade nonliberal, or more radical liberal theorists and political activists to
n1ove toward their precise version of ordered liberty. But the
authors do an excellent job of responding to the claim that
constitutional liberalism is the cause of the alleged rise of
individual irresponsibility, by setting forth an account of
constitutional liberalism that is based on doctrinal reality. This
realism about our constitutional liberalism is a correction that
most Americans-even across the political spectrum-can and
should heed.
Finally, the authors maintain this liberalism-rooted respect
for opponents' arguments even when discussing political wedge
issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Their
commitment to liberal tolerance- thin and thick-- fortifies their
54
ability to engage in respectful political discourse about these
and other, especially divisive constitutional concerns, and to give
their opponents' arguments a fair hearing. Amidst the din of
increasingly negative campaign speech, outrage news, cyberecho-chambers, and other gross distortions of political discourse,
theirs is a welcome intervention in tone as well as content.
For all of these reasons, the book makes an admirable
contribution to a most timely and fundamental debate. It would
be a terrific step forward in a political culture premised on selfgovernance if the various patriot armies marching under
American constitutional banners would pause a moment to read
it.

54. For an elaboration of principles of civil political discourse, and emerging
evidence on the consequences of extreme incivility for democratic engagement. see
Massaro & Stryker, supra note 17.

